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 1 
Introduction
1
 
 
A major development in systems for the enforcement of individual employment 
rights is the use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) procedures to resolve claims by 
employees. At their best, ADR procedures may hold the potential for greater accessibility 
by employees to enforcement of substantive employment rights, while avoiding burdens 
of excessive costs for the public and employers in processing claims. On the other hand, 
ADR procedures, particularly mandatory employment arbitration procedures, have also 
been criticized for producing the privatization of justice and denial of effective 
enforcement of employee rights. In this paper, we present the results of a new empirical 
study of employment arbitration. Despite the growing importance of employment 
arbitration in the workplace, empirical research on this phenomenon remains in its 
infancy and views on arbitration are often characterized by assumptions and anecdotal 
impressions. In the analysis presented here we attempt to systematically examine some of 
the common assumptions about the decision-making of employment arbitrators. In 
particular, we examine three propositions that are often injected into discussions of 
arbitral decision-making: 1) Arbitrators will tend to favor compromise decisions, 
proverbially “splitting the baby” between the two parties. 2) Arbitrators will be less 
inclined to award very large damage claims of the type more sometimes seen in jury 
decisions. 3) Arbitrators will prefer to award at least some small, token amount of 
damages to a party bringing a case rather than deny any recovery. We analyze these 
propositions using a unique dataset developed from analysis of employment arbitration 
                                               
1 The Authors would like to acknowledge the generous assistance of the American Arbitration Association, 
and particularly the staff of its Boston office, in providing access to the arbitration case files examined in 
this study. Any omissions or errors are, of course, our own responsibility. 
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case files of the American Arbitration Association (AAA), arguably the leading provider 
of employment arbitration services in the country.   
 
The Rise of Employment Arbitration 
 Two trends lie behind the rise of employment arbitration in American 
employment relations. The first is the growth of statutory employment rights and 
resulting litigation. The basic rule of employment law in the United States continues to be 
employment-at-will, a common law rule that an employer may dismiss an employee for 
good reason, bad reason or no reason at all, with no requirement to provide any notice 
before dismissal or pay any severance pay. Given the continued adherence by the courts 
to this principle, employment law in the U.S. has developed around a series of specific 
exceptions to the general rule. These include things like the prohibitions on dismissals for 
union organizing activity contained in the National Labor Relations Act and protections 
for whistleblowers in some limited circumstances involving strong public interests. The 
broadest area of exceptions to employment-at-will is in the statutory prohibitions against 
employment discrimination.  The initial expansion of individual employment rights came 
with the enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibited 
discrimination in employment based on race, color, sex, religion or national origin. This 
was followed by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, prohibiting 
discrimination against workers older than the age of 40, and later the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990, prohibiting discrimination against employees with disabilities. 
In addition to these federal laws, states enacted a series of parallel laws prohibiting 
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employment discrimination, some of which expanded the prohibited grounds of 
discrimination to include things like family status and sexual orientation. 
 Beyond the substantive grounds of prohibited discrimination, a key to 
understanding the U.S. system of employment law is the nature of the litigation system 
and potential remedies available for violation of these statutory rights. Initially, Title VII 
only provided for trials by judge alone and limited damages to compensation for lost 
income. However the 1991 Civil Rights Act amendments added provisions for the 
recovery of damages for pain and suffering as well as punitive damages and allowed for 
jury trials. These changes increased the potential for larger damage awards for 
employment discrimination and helped spur an increase in litigation. The relatively large 
damage awards in U.S. employment litigation are illustrated by a study of federal court 
cases from 1999 to 2000 that found an average employee win rate of 36.4%, a median 
damage award for successful plaintiffs of $150,500, and a mean damage award of 
$336,291.
2
 Similarly a study of California state court decisions found an employee win 
rate of 59% and a median damage award of $296,991.
3
 By international standards, these 
represent very large damage awards, which have served to focus U.S. employers on the 
dangers of litigation despite the relative limitations of the substantive areas of protection 
for employees.
4
 
                                               
2
 Eisenberg, Theodore, & Elizabeth Hill (2003) “Arbitration and Litigation of 
Employment Claims: An Empirical Comparison.” 58(4) Dispute Resolution J. 44. 
3
 Oppenheimer, David Benjamin (2003) “Verdicts Matter: An Empirical Study of 
California Employment Discrimination and Wrongful Discharge Jury Verdicts Reveals 
Low Success Rates for Women and Minorities” 37 U.C. Davis Law Rev. 511 (2003). 
4
 Colvin, Alexander J.S. (2006). “Flexibility and Fairness in Liberal Market Economies: 
The Comparative Impact of the Legal Environment and High Performance Work 
Systems.” British Journal of Industrial Relations. Vol. 44, No.1, pp. 73-97. 
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 The second trend that led to the rise of mandatory arbitration was a shift by the 
U.S. courts in favor of deferral to alternative dispute resolution procedures. Beginning in 
the 1970s and 80s, the U.S. courts took an increasingly favorable view of ADR as a 
mechanism for reducing litigation levels and clearing up overloaded court dockets. In a 
series of decisions in the 1980s, the U.S. Supreme Court reinterpreted the Federal 
Arbitration Act of 1926 to permit the arbitration of claims based on statutes, not just the 
contractual claims that had previously been seen as the province of arbitrators. These 
decisions initially dealt with areas such as securities law, anti-trust, and anti-racketeering 
laws. However in the 1991 case of Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
5
, the Supreme 
Court for the first time held that a claim based on an employment discrimination statute 
could be subject to arbitration. This decision set off a wave of adoption of mandatory 
arbitration procedures by employers seeking to escape from the dangers of the litigation 
system.
6
 The key feature of these mandatory arbitration procedures is that employees 
were required to agree to them as a term and condition of employment. Once entered into, 
they required that all legal claims by the employee against the employer would have to be 
brought through arbitration and the employee would no longer be able to initiate or 
appeal claims in the courts. Although some uncertainty remained as to the scope of the 
Gilmer decision, the new model of mandatory employment arbitration received the 
imprimatur of the Supreme Court in its 2001 decision in Circuit City v. Adams
7
, which 
upheld the enforceability of a mandatory arbitration procedure. Although there is no 
                                               
5
 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
6
 Colvin, Alexander J.S. (2003). “Institutional Pressures, Human Resource Strategies and 
the Rise of Nonunion Dispute Resolution Procedures.”  Industrial and Labor Relations 
Review, Vol. 56, No. 3, pp. 375-92. 
7
 532 U.S. 105 (2001). 
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definitive accounting of the number of mandatory arbitration procedures, the best survey 
evidences suggests that around a quarter to a third of all nonunion employees in the U.S. 
are now covered by mandatory arbitration procedures.
8
 With union membership now 
down to 12.3% of employees in the U.S., this suggests that mandatory employment 
arbitration has already become a significantly more widespread institution governing 
employment relations than collective bargaining and labor arbitration.  
 The rise of mandatory arbitration has sparked vociferous debates between its 
advocates and critics. Advocates of mandatory arbitration argue that it provides a faster, 
more efficient and fair alternative to the complex and unwieldy system of employment 
litigation.
9
 They note that the high costs and slow speed of the litigation system mean that 
few employees will practically be able to benefit from the large damage awards at the end 
of successful trials, whereas more employees could potentially have access to justice 
under simpler, more accessible arbitration procedures.
10
 By contrast, critics argue that the 
ability of the employer to design and promulgate mandatory arbitration procedures will 
result in a system that favors the interests of the employer over the employee and avoid 
the public scrutiny provided by the court system.
11
 They suggest that the supposed 
benefits of efficiency and accessibility of arbitration will prove illusory as employees 
                                               
8
 Colvin, Alexander J.S. (2008) “Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration: Clarity 
Amidst the Sound and Fury?” 11(2) Employee Rights and Employment Policy J. 405; 
Lewin, David (2008) “Employee Voice and Mutual Gains”, Labor and Employment 
Relations Association (LERA) Proceedings. 
9
 Sherwyn, David, Samuel Estreicher, & Michael Heise (2005) “Assessing the Case for 
Employment Arbitration: A New Direction for Empirical Research” 57 Stanford Law Rev. 
1557. 
10
 Estreicher, Samuel (2001) “Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate Over Pre-
Dispute Employment Arbitration Agreements” 16 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resolution 559. 
11
 Stone, Katherine Van Wezel (1996) “Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment 
Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s” 73 Denver U. Law Rev. 1017. 
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have to grapple with a system over which they lack control and that produces outcomes 
tending to favor employers.
12
 Empirical research on these issues has been relatively 
limited, in part due to the difficulties in gathering data on what are essentially private 
dispute resolution procedures.
13
   
 
Arbitral Decision-Making Tendencies 
 What processes are involved in arbitrator decision-making? Arbitration as a 
privately ordered process is a creation of the agreement of the two parties. The arbitrator 
decides the case because he or she has been selected jointly by the two parties to serve as 
the decision-maker. To the degree that the arbitrator wishes to achieve selection for future 
cases as an arbitrator, this will create an incentive for the arbitrator to attempt to satisfy 
both parties in the decision-making process. As a result, arbitrators have sometimes been 
thought of as having a tendency towards decisions that are compromises between the 
positions of the two parties. This criticism has been leveled at arbitral decisions in 
international arbitration.
14
 By contrast, others have criticized this assumption and argued 
that arbitrators do not engage in such proverbial “splitting the baby” (e.g. Drahozal, 2008; 
                                               
12
 Schwartz, David (2009) “Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness” 84 Notre Dame Law 
Rev. 1247. 
13
 Colvin, Alexander J.S. (2008) “Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration: 
Clarity Amidst the Sound and Fury?” 11(2) Employee Rights and Employment Policy J. 
405. 
14
 Juster, Kenneth I. (1999) “The Santa Elena Case: Two Steps Forward, Three Steps 
Back” 10 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 371-381. 
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Keer and Naimark, 2001).
15
 In this paper we will attempt to test empirically whether 
employment arbitrators in fact engage in splitting the baby. 
 A tendency to engage in the splitting the baby approach to arbitral decision-
making making could manifest itself in two respects. One is to balance over time who 
wins each case, so that each side (e.g. employers and employees in employment 
arbitration) will end winning roughly half of the total number of cases.
16
 Here the 
argument is that arbitrators depending on the willingness of both parties to agree to their 
appointment for future business, the arbitrator will try to ensure that he or she has a 
record of regularly ruling in favor of both parties. This is not to say that the arbitrator will 
make rulings that clearly depart from his or her charge to apply the labor contract to the 
dispute in question. However in marginal cases, such as those turning on subjective 
judgments of the import of particular conduct, the arbitrator may have a tendency to 
balance out who is favored in decisions over a period of time.  
A second manifestation of splitting the baby in decision-making occurs in 
situations where some amount of damages awarded. A tendency to favor compromise 
decisions could be seen here in the awarding of some, but only part, of the damages 
claimed.
17
 For example, an exact splitting might be manifested in an award of half the 
amount claimed. Such compromise awards may be justified by the facts of the case, but 
                                               
15
 Drahozal, Christopher R. (2008). “Busting Arbitration Myths” 56 Kan. L. Rev. 663-676; 
Keer, Stephanie E. & Richard W. Naimark. (2001) “Arbitrators Do Not ‘Split the Baby’: 
Empirical Evidence from International Business Arbitrations” 18 J. Int’l Arb. 573.  
 
16
 Drahozal, Christopher R. (2008). “Busting Arbitration Myths” 56 Kan. L. Rev. 663-676. 
17
 Ibid.; Keer, Stephanie E. & Richard W. Naimark. (2001) “Arbitrators Do Not ‘Split the 
Baby’: Empirical Evidence from International Business Arbitrations” 18 J. Int’l Arb. 573.  
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the critique is that arbitrators too often make these types of compromise awards in an 
attempt to keep both parties reasonably satisfied.  
Concerns about splitting-the-baby decision-making are particularly strong in the 
area of interest arbitration, which is often used in public sector collective bargaining as an 
alternative to strikes. Where the arbitrator is charged with determining the provisions of 
the contract as a substitute for bargaining, there is a particular danger that the arbitrator 
will attempt to achieve the appearance of fairness by splitting the difference between the 
two parties’ final offers. This may create disincentives for the parties to compromise in 
bargaining and excessive reliance on arbitration. In direct response to this danger, the 
method of final-offer arbitration, whether the arbitrator can only choose one of the 
parties’ final offers or the other, was developed in interest arbitration settings to avoid 
split the difference awards.  
Drawing on this comparison to labor arbitration, the first proposition about 
employment arbitration decision-making that we will test is that: 
Proposition 1: Employment arbitrators will tend to favor decisions that 
compromise between the parties.     
 A second starting point for thinking about arbitral decision-making tendencies is 
to compare employment arbitrators to litigation decision-making a step further and 
consider whether there is likely to be a difference in how arbitrators respond to particular 
kinds of claims. A common complaint against litigation, particularly cited by business in 
justifying adoption of arbitration, is that juries are unpredictable, are more sympathetic to 
consumers and employees than to businesses, and subject to emotional appeals that lead 
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to extremely large damage awards not justified by the facts of the case.
18
 By contrast, 
arbitrators are professional neutrals and may be less likely to be swayed by rhetoric or 
emotional appeals. Instead, as experts in the area, arbitrators may be offended by 
advocates for parties who make overly inflated damage claims. If this is the case, we 
would expect to see a process in which arbitrators are much less likely to award most of 
the amount claimed if there was a large initial claim. If accurate, this phenomenon could 
provide an important incentive for employers concerned about large damage awards from 
juries to adopt employer-promulgated arbitration procedures. Conversely the assumption 
that employment arbitrators will be less likely to make very large damage awards may 
underlie some of the opposition to employment arbitration by plaintiff employee side 
groups. It suggests the following proposition: 
Proposition 2: Employment arbitrators will tend to disfavor awarding the full 
amount of very large damage claims, even where liability is found.  
An alternative tendency sometimes claimed for arbitrators relative to the courts is 
that they will be more likely to award some smaller amount of damages even when 
liability might not supported on the relevant legal standard. Litigation in the courts is 
designed to be an all-or-nothing decision-making process on the issue of liability. For 
example, absent proof of discrimination, a court should deny any liability to an employee 
on a claim of employment discrimination, regardless of any issue of general fairness in 
employment decision-making or however the judge or jury may feel about the propriety 
of the employer’s conduct. Arbitrators are traditionally not bound by the same rules of 
                                               
18
 Drahozal, Christopher R. (2004) “Mandatory Arbitration: A Behavioral Analysis of 
Private Judging” 67 Law & Contemp. Prob. 105-132; Sternlight, Jean R. (1996) “Panacea 
or Corporate Tool? Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration” 
74 Wash. U.L.Q. 637. 
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evidence as courts and may not be as narrowly constrained in the factors they consider in 
their decision-making. To the degree that fairness norms are incorporated into arbitral 
decision-making in addition to strict legal standards, employment arbitrators may tend to 
make at least some amount of an award to an employee claimant in cases where there has 
been unfairness in the employer’s decision even if it does not rise to the level of a 
statutory or contractual violation that would justify awarding the full claim. If there is a 
tendency of employment arbitrators to award employee complaints some degree of 
recovery base on fairness norms, then this would tend to make arbitration a more 
attractive process for employees and their representatives to choose. Conversely, if there 
is a fear that arbitrators will tend to incorporate fairness norms into their decision-making 
and award claimants at least some smaller amount even in the absence of full liability, 
then this may lead some employers to disfavor arbitration.
19
 Put alternatively, if litigation 
can provide employers with more of a full shield against liability than arbitration, then 
the incentive to use arbitration will be lower. To investigate whether this is true, we test 
the following proposition: 
Proposition 3: Employment arbitrators will tend to make small awards in favor of 
employee claimants rather than full deny any liability in cases. 
 
The Data 
 For this study, we analyzed employment arbitration case files for the year 2008 
made available to us by the American Arbitration Association (AAA). The AAA is the 
                                               
19
 Porter, Nicole B. (2008) “The Perfect Compromise: Bridging the Gap Between At-Will 
Employment and Just Cause” 87 Neb. L. Rev. 62 at 115. 
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largest arbitration service provider in the employment arbitration field. Many employers 
explicitly designate the AAA as the service provider in their standard arbitration 
agreements with employees and incorporate the AAA’s employment arbitration rules into 
their procedures by reference. Use of AAA employment arbitration case files has the 
advantage of providing a reasonably large data source for analysis. Given its size and 
prominence in the employment arbitration field, the AAA’s cases can be taken as 
representative of a significant segment of employment arbitration activity.  
At the same time, there may be some limitations on generalizability to the whole 
universe of employment arbitration. The AAA has played a prominent role in debates 
around employment arbitration and was represented in the task force that developed the 
Due Process Protocol to establish basic fairness standards for employment arbitration. 
The AAA’s own rules for administration of employment arbitration cases reflect features 
of the Due Process Protocol. As an organization, the AAA has indicated that it will not 
administer arbitration cases under procedures that violate its own rules. However 
employers are also free to craft procedures that designate their own arbitrators and rules 
and do not make use of any third party arbitration service provider – what are commonly 
known as ‘ad hoc’ arbitrations. It is unknown to what degree these ad hoc arbitrations do 
or do not operate under procedures incorporating similar due process protections to those 
provided by the AAA rules. As a result, it is certainly possible that our analysis is 
examining a segment of the employment arbitration field operating under relatively 
higher fairness protections. 
 We obtained basic data on all 440 employment arbitration cases administered by 
the AAA that were awarded and closed during the 2008 calendar year. This included 
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information on claim and award amounts. We also coded additional information from a 
sample of 286 arbitration case files. This allowed us to gather more detailed data on these 
cases, such as the type of legal claim being made and characteristics of the employee 
involved.   
  
Case Characteristics 
Agreement and Plaintiff Category 
 In analyzing data on employment arbitration cases, it is important to recognize 
that there are a number of different categories of cases involved. The first distinction to 
draw is between cases deriving from employer-promulgated procedures and cases 
deriving from individually-negotiated agreements. Under employer-promulgated 
procedures, the employer presents the arbitration agreement to the employee, usually at 
the time of hiring, on a take-it-or-leave-it basis as a term and condition of employment. In 
this context, standard procedures are designed to cover employees as a group, similar to 
general work rules or benefit plans. This type of arbitration agreement is a classic 
adhesive contract. By contrast, under individually-negotiated agreements, arbitration is 
included as a provision in an individual employment contract whose terms are subject to 
bargaining between the parties. Whereas most employees may be employed under the 
standard policies of the employer, individually negotiated contracts are more common 
amongst executives and employees with highly valued skills and knowledge that give 
them enhanced individual bargaining power. For these employees, arbitration may have 
attractions for resolving contractual disputes due its greater speed and confidentiality.  
 13 
 The AAA administers employment arbitration cases deriving from both 
employer-promulgated procedures and individually-negotiated agreements. Some early 
studies of employment arbitration included cases from both categories together in their 
analysis.
20
 However subsequent research has indicated that there may be substantial 
differences between these two categories of cases, producing differences in the case 
outcomes.
21
 In particular, whereas relatively high employee win rates of 50-60 percent 
were found in samples including cases based on individually-negotiated agreements, 
employee win rates appear to be much lower under employer-promulgated procedures.
22
 
One obvious difference is that employees able to individually negotiate their own 
employment contract are likely to have greater financial resources and sophistication, 
including better legal representation, in the event that they become involved in a legal 
conflict with their employer. In addition, they will often be able to bring claims based on 
the provisions of their individual employment contract, whereas most employers in the 
U.S. are careful to draft standard employment handbooks and policies so that they do not 
alter the default American rule of employment-at-will. Given all of these differences, in 
our analysis we examine cases based on employer-promulgated procedures and 
individually-negotiated agreements separately. 
                                               
20
 Bingham, Lisa B. (1998). “An Overview of Employment Arbitration in the United 
States: Law, Public Policy and Data.” 23(2) New Zealand J. of Industrial Relations 5; 
Maltby, Lewis L. (1998) “Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights.” 30 
Columbia Human Rights Law Rev. 29.  
21
 Eisenberg, Theodore, & Elizabeth Hill (2003) “Arbitration and Litigation of 
Employment Claims: An Empirical Comparison.” 58(4) Dispute Resolution J. 44. 
22
 Colvin, Alexander J.S. (2008) “Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration: 
Clarity Amidst the Sound and Fury?” 11(2) Employee Rights and Employment Policy J. 
405; Colvin, Alexander J.S. (2011). “An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: 
Case Outcomes and Processes.” Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 1-
23.  
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 The second major distinction in types of cases in employment arbitration is 
between those involving claims by the employee and those involving claims by the 
employer. As in other contexts, such as labor arbitration, the typical employment law 
case is one in which the employee is making some claim of unfair treatment by the 
employer. Common examples would be claims such as wrongful dismissal, sexual 
harassment in the workplace or violation of wages and hours laws. However there are 
also occasional cases in which the employer is making a claim against the employee. 
Examples of these types of cases include situations where the employer is attempting to 
recover wages or other payments advanced to the employee or where the employer 
alleges that the employee has appropriated intellectual property or trade secrets belonging 
to the employer. Although less common, these cases where the employer is the plaintiff 
may have different characteristics from those where the employee is the plaintiff and so 
we examine them separately in our analysis.  
 Overall in our dataset, there were 320 cases deriving from employer-promulgated 
procedures, 293 in which the employee was the plaintiff and 27 in which the employer 
was the plaintiff. There were 117 cases deriving from individually-negotiated agreements, 
98 in which the employee was the plaintiff and 19 in which the employer was the plaintiff. 
Summary statistics for our sample are presented in Table One. 
 
Sample Characteristics 
 We begin by examining the characteristics of the employees involved in the cases 
in our sample. In cases based on employer-promulgated procedures, just over half of the 
employees were male (56.7%), and around a third involved managerial employees 
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(31.0%) or professionals (35.7%). Most of these cases (81.5%) involved employees 
whose salary levels were under $100,000 per year. By contrast, employees in cases 
deriving from individually-negotiated agreement were much more likely to be male 
(86.3%), and managers (66.7%) or professionals (69.8%). These employees also tended 
to be more highly paid, with 58.7% of them making between $100,000 and $250,000, and 
18.7% making more than $250,000. 
 Another difference between cases in the two categories is that AAA rules provide 
that the employer must pay the arbitrator and administrative fees under employer-
promulgated procedures, whereas in cases deriving from individually-negotiated 
agreements, the agreement can specify how fees are to be split. Reflecting this difference 
in the rules, in 95% of the cases deriving from employer-promulgated procedures that we 
examined, the procedure provided that the employer paid 100% of the arbitrator and 
administrative fees, apart from small employee filing fees equal to standard court filing 
fees ($150 or less). By contrast, although in 58% of the cases deriving from individually-
negotiated agreements, the employer paid the full arbitrator and administrator fees, in 
35% of these cases the fees were split equally between the employer and employee. 
Beyond the rule difference, the number of fee-splitting arrangements in the individually-
negotiated agreement cases likely reflects the greater ability to pay of these higher salary 
employees. 
 An interesting characteristic of employment arbitration cases is the degree to 
which the claims are based on employment discrimination statutes as opposed to 
contractual or common law claims. This is an important issue in the debates around 
mandatory arbitration in the U.S., because the key cases such as Gilmer and Circuit City 
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focused on the issue of the arbitrability of claims based on employment statutes. Many of 
the critiques of mandatory arbitration have focused on the question of whether it is 
appropriate to allow private arbitrators deriving their authority from an employer-
promulgated procedure to have decision-making power over statutory employment rights. 
Some earlier research on employment arbitration suggested that most arbitration claims 
were not based on discrimination statutes and so these concerns were misplaced.
23
 
However that research involved samples with larger numbers of cases based on 
individually-negotiated agreements and relatively few cases based on employer-
promulgated procedures. We classified the cases in our sample based on whether or not 
they included an employment discrimination based claim. Amongst the cases with 
employee plaintiffs brought under employer-promulgated procedures, 48.4% included a 
claim of some form of employment discrimination. This result indicates that statute based 
claims of employment discrimination are a common element in arbitration under 
employer-promulgated procedures. The differing earlier research results were likely 
influenced by the experience of arbitration under individually-negotiated agreements, 
which is much more likely to be based on claims of breach of the individual employment 
contract. Supporting this interpretation, we found that in our sample amongst cases based 
on individually-negotiated agreements with employee plaintiffs only 10.2% included 
claims of employment discrimination, with breach of contract being the basis for most of 
the claims.  
 
Case Outcomes 
                                               
23
 Eisenberg, Theodore, & Elizabeth Hill (2003) “Arbitration and Litigation of 
Employment Claims: An Empirical Comparison.” 58(4) Dispute Resolution J. 44. 
 17 
 The key outcomes in an arbitration award are whether the plaintiff is successful in 
establishing that the defendant was at fault and, if so, what amounts of damages are 
awarded. On the first element, a simple definition of whether the plaintiff won the case is 
whether liability was established and some amount of damages was awarded. It is 
certainly possible to use other definitions of plaintiff success, such as looking at whether 
the plaintiff won a substantial amount of damages in the context of the case. Indeed, we 
will later examine the issue of the relationship between claim and award amounts. 
However for a useful starting point, we examine whether the plaintiff won in the sense of 
establishing some degree of liability and what the damages awarded were. In table one, 
we report these outcomes by type of case and whether the employer or employee was the 
plaintiff. 
 Situations where there is an employee plaintiff under an employer-promulgated 
procedure are the paradigmatic example in debates around mandatory arbitration, and the 
largest category of cases, so we examine these first. The employee win rate in these 294 
cases was 25.2%. Amongst the cases where the employee established some degree of 
liability, the mean damages awarded were $81,835. This also results in a mean damage 
award across all cases, including those where zero damages were awarded (i.e. there was 
no liability established) of $19,966. We were also able to separate out cases that involved 
employment discrimination cases. Amongst these discrimination based cases, the 
employee win rate was 18.8% and the mean damage award including the zero damages 
cases was $21,871. Compared to the outcomes of litigation in the U.S. courts, these are 
relatively lower win rates and award amounts. For example, studies have found employee 
win rates ranging from 36.4% in federal courts to 57% in state courts, with mean damage 
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awards for successful plaintiffs of $336,291 in the federal court cases and $462,307 in the 
state court cases.
24
 However it is also important to recognize that there may be 
differences in the types of cases that end up in arbitration compared to litigation, which 
can affect these outcomes.  
 Outcomes varied substantially by case and plaintiff type. We present a 
comparison of outcomes based on these two factors in Table Two. In cases with 
employee plaintiffs under individually-negotiated agreements, the employee win rate was 
64.6%, with a mean damage award amongst successful plaintiffs of $220,376 and a mean 
award for all plaintiffs (including zero dollar awards) of $142,465. There are a number of 
reasons that may explain the greater success of employees in arbitration under 
individually-negotiated agreements. The substantive basis for their claims may have a 
naturally stronger grounding in breach of contract arguments deriving from provisions 
they negotiated to protect their own interests. By contrast, employees under employer-
promulgated procedures are more likely to have to frame their claims around harder to 
prove allegations of discriminatory treatment or the limited exceptions to the employment 
at will doctrine. Employees under individually-negotiated agreements are also likely to 
have greater personal financial resources, as supported by our findings of higher salary 
levels for these workers. This may allow them to retain better legal counsel, increasing 
their chances of success. Their greater salary levels are also likely to result in larger 
damage amounts for lost income. All these factors reinforce the advantages of employees 
under individually-negotiated agreements compared to their compatriots under employer-
                                               
24
 Ibid. 
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promulgated procedures. They also indicate the importance of separating these categories 
in any analysis of employment arbitration.  
 Cases in which the employer is the plaintiff may also have different 
characteristics from the more typical case in which the employee is the plaintiff. We find 
that amongst the small group of cases under employer-promulgated procedures in which 
the employer was the plaintiff, these employers won 57.1% of their cases, were awarded 
mean damages of $39,002 where they were successful and mean damages of $21,668 
across all cases, including those where zero damages were awarded. One likely 
explanation for the greater win rate of employer than employee plaintiffs under 
employer-promulgated procedures is that different types of claims are involved in the two 
groups of cases. It may be relatively easier for an employer to establish that an employee 
was overpaid wages or commissions or breached an employment contract than it is for an 
employee plaintiff to establish that a manager had a discriminatory motive for differential 
treatment of the employee.    
 One factor that may be associated with differences in outcomes across cases is the 
characteristics of arbitrator. In Table Three, we explore two arbitrator characteristics that 
might be associated with differences in arbitration outcome. We first look at the effect of 
arbitrator membership in the National Academy of Arbitrators (NAA), the leading 
professional association of labor arbitrators. Membership in the NAA might be associated 
with differences in arbitral outcomes if NAA members tended to import into the 
employment arbitration setting some of the principles or decision-making tendencies 
from the labor arbitration setting in which its members predominantly practice. This 
could produce a greater likelihood of favor employees, reflecting the more typical just 
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cause standard applied in labor arbitration dismissal cases, or perhaps a lower likelihood 
of award large amounts of compensatory or punitive damages, which are not typically 
available in labor arbitration. We see little evidence of any effect of NAA membership on 
arbitral outcomes. Plaintiff win rates and award amounts are relatively similar between 
NAA member and non-member arbitrators. The most noteworthy difference is that NAA 
members tend to command higher fees in employment arbitration, on average $16,641 
compared to an average fee of $12,448 for non-NAA members. 
 We also investigated whether arbitrator gender had any impact on arbitral 
outcomes. There is a long tradition of research on decision-maker gender effects on 
dispute resolution outcome that has looked at both judicial and labor arbitration forums, 
which has produced mixed findings.
25
 We find that female arbitrators are less likely to 
find in favor of employees than male arbitrators, with a plaintiff win rate of only 20.0% 
for female arbitrators compared to 27.5% for male arbitrators. This is a surprising finding, 
which was not suggested by the prior literature. Our sample included a relatively high 
proportion of female arbitrators (37.1%) compared to past research, which included 
relatively few female judges or female labor arbitrators. One possibility that needs to be 
investigated further is whether there are systematic differences in the professional 
backgrounds of female arbitrators. For example, are female employment arbitrators more 
likely to come from backgrounds representing management? Do they differ in experience 
levels from their male counterparts? Given the intriguing findings in this study, further 
investigation of these questions is warranted.  
 
                                               
25
 Bemmels, Brian. (1990). “Gender Effects in Grievance Arbitration.” Industrial 
Relations, Vol. 29(3), pp. 513-525. 
 21 
Arbitral Decision-Making Process Results 
The first arbitral decision-making proposition we examine is whether there is a 
‘split-the-baby’ type favoring of compromise decisions in employment arbitration 
decision-making. There are a number of different potential indicators of such a tendency 
that we can look at. First, we can look at whether plaintiff win rates suggest an attempt to 
approximate a 50/50 split between the parties over time. So for example, a labor 
arbitrator hoping to seek future selection by both union and management might tend 
towards balancing out over time how many cases are won by each side. However, if we 
examine the plaintiff win rates reported in table 1, we see little evidence of this type of a 
split-the-baby approach by employment arbitrators. In cases under employer-promulgated 
procedures where the employee is the plaintiff, employees win 25.2%% of the time and 
employers win 74.8% of the time, which does not suggest an attempt to split the 
outcomes between the parties. Cases employer plaintiffs under employer-promulgated 
procedures were closer to an even split, with employers winning 57.1% of the time and 
employees 42.9% of the time. When we look at cases deriving from individually-
negotiated agreements, we again see a lack of evidence of 50/50 splitting with plaintiffs 
winning almost 2/3rds of the cases, whether brought by employees (64.6% win rate) or 
employers (66.7% win rate).   
Second, we can investigate whether the amounts awarded in cases tend to reflect 
compromise awards. To analyze this question, we looked at the relationship between 
claim amounts and award amounts in the cases in our dataset. We calculated the 
percentage of the initial claim that the plaintiff received in the award. For simplicity of 
presentation, we group the percentages of claim received into six categories: zero 
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recovery; 1-20%; 21-40%; 41-60%; 61-80%; and >81%. We then tabulated the numbers 
of cases in each of these categories (see Table Four) and graphed the results (see Figure 
One). If the arbitrators were engaging in splitting-the-baby, we would expect to see a 
more normal shaped distribution, with most of the cases clustering in the middle 
categories. What we find instead in the data is a U-shaped distribution, with most of the 
cases clustering at either end of the distribution. For cases brought under employer-
promulgated procedures, the largest category are cases with zero recovery, but the second 
largest category is cases where the plaintiff recovered over 80% of the amount claimed. 
The most sparsely populated categories are those where the plaintiffs recovered between 
20 and 80% of the amount claimed. Only 17 of 196 cases (or 8.7%) fell in these 
categories. The distribution of percentages recovered in cases deriving from individually-
negotiated agreements also form a U-shaped distribution (see Figure Two), with the 
lowest and highest percentage recovery categories containing the largest number of cases. 
The categories between 20 and 80% recovered are also the most sparsely populated in 
this distribution.  
What these results indicate is that there is a lack of any evidence that arbitrators 
engage in split-the-baby type compromise decision-making in employment arbitration. 
Rather than look to labor and interest arbitration based models to understand employment 
arbitration decision-making, it may make more sense to compare it to the decision-
making process in the courts. Judicial decision-making generally involves two distinct 
phases, determination of liability and determination of damages. Initially the court 
determines whether there is any legal liability by applying the appropriate legal standard. 
If there is determined to be liability, then a separate determination is made of what the 
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damages suffered were and an appropriate award is made. In neither of these stages is 
there a process of balancing the positions of the two parties as is alleged to occur with 
split-the-baby arbitral decision-making. The picture we have seen in the data of 
employment arbitration decision-making much more closely resembles this judicial 
model than the proposition that arbitrators look to compromise between the positions of 
the two sides.  
The second arbitral decision-making proposition was that employment arbitrators 
would tend to disfavor very large damage claims. We can test this argument by 
examining the distribution of percentages recovered for cases with large claims. Table 
Three presents the same categories of percentages recovered limited to only those cases 
where plaintiff claimed over $500,000 in damages. Unlike the U-shaped distribution of 
percentages recovered we found overall, for cases with large damage claims we find a 
skewed distribution tapering off at the higher categories (see Figure Three). The largest 
categories are still zero recovery, but for both the employer-promulgated procedure and 
individually-negotiated agreement distributions, the second largest category of awards is 
where the plaintiff recovered between 0 and 20% of the amount claimed. Whereas 
employment arbitrators do not appear to split-the-baby, this evidence suggests that they 
do tend to be less likely to grant the full amount on larger damage claims, supporting the 
second proposition about arbitral decision-making.  
The third arbitral decision-making proposition was that employment arbitrators 
would tend to make some small award in favor of many claimants rather than fully 
denying liability. Put alternatively, the idea here was that if you go to arbitration, the 
arbitrator is going to tend to want to give you something rather than entirely rejecting 
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your claim. Our results do not provide much support for this proposition. There are 
relatively few small award cases. For example, the 25
th
 percentile of the distribution of 
awards in cases brought by employees under employer-promulgated procedures is 
$12,770, meaning that only a quarter of awards are smaller than that amount. Indeed, 
most awards from this type of case were over $39,609 (the median award amount).   
 
Conclusion 
 The rise of employment arbitration represents a major institutional innovation in 
the governance of employment relations in the United States. Rather than simply a 
development of new ADR techniques to manage conflict, employment arbitration is 
developing a new institutional structure for how disputes between employers and 
employees will be resolved. To help understand this new institution of nonunion 
employment relations, we gathered and analyzed data from arbitration cases administered 
by the AAA, a leading provider of arbitration services. Our key conclusions are that the 
characteristics and outcomes of arbitration cases are strongly influenced by the nature of 
the contractual relationships underlying arbitration and that the outcomes of arbitration 
reflect a decision-making process more similar to that of litigation than the split-the-baby 
type compromise processes sometimes ascribed to arbitrators.  
 We find major differences in outcomes of arbitration depending on whether the 
case originated from an employer-promulgated procedure or from an individually-
negotiated agreement. Arbitration cases deriving from individually-negotiated 
agreements tend to involve higher paid professional or managerial employees making 
contractual claims and result in relatively high employee win rates, larger damage awards, 
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and more compromise awards. Arbitration cases deriving from employer-promulgated 
procedures tend to involve lower paid employees, commonly are based on statutory 
claims of employment discrimination, and result in relatively fewer employee wins, 
lower damages, and fewer compromise awards. 
 When we look at decision-making processes in employment arbitration, we see 
more resemblance to a legal process of determining liability and damages than to a labor 
or interest arbitration process of balancing the positions of the parties through 
compromise decisions and evening out of the success rates of each side. To the degree 
that there is a particular effect of employment arbitration decision-making, we find it is 
more one of reducing large claim amounts rather than splitting-the-baby between the two 
sides. In addition, we find that there is little evidence that arbitrators tend to hand out 
small token awards in cases rather than simply denying liability. What this suggests to us 
is that while it is important for labor relations researchers to bring their research tools to 
bear on the new processes of nonunion employment relations, they should also be careful 
not to assume that the lessons learned in the unionized arena transfer easily into the 
nonunion realm.   
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Table One 
Summary Statistics for Full Sample and by Agreement Type 
 
 Full Sample Employer-
Promulgated: 
Employee Plaintiff 
Individually-
Negotiated: 
Employee Plaintiff 
# of Cases 
 
440 294 99 
Claim Amount 
(Mean) 
$1,201,640 $833,884 $1,775,970 
Claim Amount 
(Median) 
$190,000 $167,880 $233,427 
Plaintiff Win 
 (%) 
37.8% 25.2% 64.6% 
Award Amount  
(Mean – wins only) 
$137,869 $81,835 $220,376 
Award Amount  
(Median – wins only) 
$47,384 $36,609 $75,000 
Award Amount 
(Mean – all cases) 
$51,344 $19,967 $142,465 
Partial Award  
(20-80% of claim) 
15.6% 7.9% 26.0% 
Arbitrator Fee  
(Mean) 
$14,875 $12,657 $19,375 
Discrimination Claims 
(%) 
34.1% 48.9% 6.9% 
Employment Standards 
(%) 
3.6% 4.8% 1.3% 
NAA Arbitrator  
(%) 
13.2% 13.6% 12.2% 
Female Arbitrator  
(%) 
37.1% 37.1% 32.7% 
Female Plaintiff 
(%) 
35.7% 45.9% 11.2% 
Female Plaintiff’s 
Attorney (%) 
19.8% 23.2% 10.1% 
Employee Self-
Represented (%) 
25.5% 30.6% 10.1% 
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Table Two 
Case Outcomes by Plaintiff and Agreement Type 
 
 Plaintiff 
Win Rate 
Average Damages  
(plaintiff wins) 
Average Damages 
(all cases) 
Employer-Promulgated 
Procedures:  
Employee Plaintiff 
25.2% 
(n=294) 
$81,835 
(n=71) 
$19,967 
(n=294) 
Employer-Promulgated 
Procedures:  
Employer Plaintiff 
57.1% 
(n=28) 
$39,002 
(n=15) 
$21,668 
(n=27) 
Individually-Negotiated 
Agreements: 
Employee Plaintiff 
64.6% 
(n=99) 
$220,376 
(n=64) 
$142,465 
(n=99) 
Individually-Negotiated 
Agreements: 
Employer Plaintiff 
66.7% 
(n=18) 
$152,947 
(n=12) 
$101,964 
(n=18) 
 
 28 
Table Three 
Case Outcomes by Arbitrator Characteristics 
(Employer-Promulgated/Employee-Plaintiff Cases) 
 
 NAA Member Non-NAA 
Member 
Male 
Arbitrator 
Female 
Arbitrator 
 (N=40) 
 
(N=254) (N=193) (N=100) 
Claim Amount 
(Mean) 
$1,137,885 $781,884 $824,354 $868,363 
Claim Amount 
(Median) 
$120,313 $185,333 $180,000 $136,512 
Plaintiff Win  
(%) 
25.0% 25.2% 27.5% 20.0% 
Award Amount 
(Mean –wins only) 
$96,481 $80,234 $83,400 $78,735 
Award Amount 
(Mean – all cases) 
$18,253 $20,216 $22,588 $14,462 
Partial Award 
(20-80% of claim) 
7.7% 7.9% 8.3% 7.1% 
Arbitrator Fee 
(Mean) 
$16,641 $12,029 $12,723 $12,448 
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Table Four 
Proportions of Claim Awarded 
 
Percentage of Claim 
Awarded 
Employer-Promulgated 
Procedures 
Individually-Negotiated 
Agreements 
Zero 119 38 
>0-20% 21 17 
20-40% 6 13 
40-60% 5 9 
60-80% 6 9 
80+% 39 25 
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Table Five 
Proportions of Claim Awarded for  
Cases with Claims Over $500,000 
 
Percentage of Claim 
Awarded 
Employer-Promulgated 
Procedures 
Individually-Negotiated 
Agreements 
Zero 33 14 
>0-20% 7 8 
20-40% 1 6 
40-60% 1 1 
60-80% 0 2 
80+% 1 2 
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Figure One 
Percentage of Claims Awarded in  
Employer-Promulgated Procedure Cases 
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Figure Two 
Percentage of Claims Awarded in 
Individually-Negotiated Agreement Cases 
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Figure Three 
Percentage of Claims Awarded in 
Cases with Claims over $500,000 
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